24 Mar Open doors: Official complicity in cross-border rhino horn poaching and smuggling
An Oxpeckers reporter speaks to syndicate insiders about the role of corrupt law enforcement officials enabling cross-border illegal trade in rhino horns
Casual exchange or calculated complicity? A BMA guard shares a moment with a driver at the Lebombo border – a routine stop that investigators say may mask a darker role in enabling rhino poaching networks. Photo supplied
At a smugglers’ “den” near the Lebombo post between South Africa and Mozambique, a former rhino horn smuggler described how border officials receive bribes to ensure safe passage for illicit goods.
“If you know the right police manning the border crossing, no problems are encountered. Money talks,” he said.
Atanasio* said he currently works as a mechanic in the border area and manages a drug-smuggling operation. He has multiple identities and has gone undetected by law enforcement agencies.
The smuggler’s den, masquerading as a car-spraying workshop, was a chaotic mix of industry and crime. Two freshly painted white cars gleamed in the sun, surrounded by colourful body panels, scattered seats and stacks of paint tins. Crates of empty beer bottles hinted at a sideline trade, and the air reeked of dagga, paint thinner and stale beer. Atanasio tossed two “bankies” of high-grade dagga on to a car seat and rolled a “zol”, keeping the rest of the stash hidden.
Inside the smugglers’ den: Crates of empty beer bottles hinted at a sideline trade, and the air reeked of dagga, paint thinner and stale beer. Photo supplied
Coded language
Atanasio said a Vietnamese couple had initially recruited him to smuggle rhino horn from Mbombela in Mpumalanga to Maputo, and sometimes from Limpopo to Naçau in Mozambique, and after this the horns would be moved to Asia. However, he began working independently after his “employers” vanished.
The rhino horn syndicates use coded language in WhatsApp messages to communicate pickup and drop-off locations, he said. When they go through the border, police deliberately ignore the smuggling of rhino horn and other contraband into Mozambique.
His allegations of police complicity in cross-border smuggling were borne out during days of surveillance by Oxpeckers Investigative Environmental Journalism at the Lebombo border post, where officials appeared to be turning a blind eye to smuggling, and the collection of instructions from smugglers was witnessed.
Guarding the border, or greasing palms? Corrupt police on the South Africa-Mozambique border stand accused of turning the Lebombo checkpoint into a trafficking open door, fuelling wildlife crimes. Photo supplied
Unchecked crossings, unchecked crimes? As a woman strolls unchallenged into Mozambique and vehicles flow freely, distracted BMA guards and police linger in casual chats – ignoring the porous border that traffickers exploit to fuel rhino slaughter. Photo supplied
Negligence or enablement? As BMA guards and police lounge casually chatting with vendors, ignoring unchecked movement, the border becomes a theatre of neglect. Experts say this laxity is not oversight but an open door for traffickers smuggling rhino horns and wildlife contraband. Photo supplied
Smuggling route
Atanasio said the N4 freeway crossing both countries is a popular smuggling route, but he avoids the highway because corrupt officials at roadblocks often demand bribes.
“A lot of ‘crooks’ are on the highways doing roadblocks,” he said. “If you get caught with rhino horns on the highway, be ready to give them money; otherwise, you get arrested. Most times they want anything between R10,000 and R30,000, depending on the situation.”
Small border crossings and insider connections have been the key to his success, he said. He pointed to a bush-infested dirt road leading to a crossing in Jeppes Reef near Malalane, and the Crocodile River that flows between the two countries, as examples.
“I prefer routes that have been passed on to me by others. You get to know these roads either on foot or by vehicle.” The easiest route, he added, is catching a taxi from Bushbuckridge in Mpumalanga into Chokwe in Mozambique.
Shadow trade in broad daylight: A stone’s throw from Lebombo’s official border crossing, a taxi rank buzzes with drivers, marshals, and suspected smugglers —marked by sharp shoes and hushed deals. As vendors glance but walk on, flimsy shacks of plastic and logs cloak transactions far from cameras and cops. Photo supplied
Illicit markets
Annette Hübschle, an expert in illicit markets, confirmed that traffickers often rely on smaller, less regulated border crossings and insider information to evade detection.
“Weak border enforcement is a product of under-resourced agencies and poor coordination. Traffickers have continuously adapted their methods, using smaller border crossings and legal trade routes to bypass enforcement measures,” she said.
Once across into Mozambique, Atanasio would drop off the horns at different locations each time. It could be at a shop in Maputo or at the market, sometimes with a man on a motorbike, he said. He got between R10,000 and R15,000, depending on the parcel being delivered.
Hübschle said insider collaboration is not uncommon. “Corrupt officials provide traffickers with the tools and intelligence they need to operate with impunity.”
Corruption within law enforcement and border agencies creates a perverse incentive structure, she added: “Traffickers can rely on bribes and insider information to ensure safe passage. This undermines even the most robust anti-poaching efforts. Without corrupt actors, traffickers would struggle to move horn efficiently across borders.”
Breach in plain sight: A vehicle-sized gash in the border fence near Lebombo marks a smuggler’s highway, exploited under cover of darkness when patrols vanish. While officials tout ‘secure’ checkpoints, this ravaged wire whispers the truth: a lifeline for traffickers, made possible by complicity and neglect. Photo supplied
The shooter
Zitha* was a former migrant farm worker in Limpopo before he turned to rhino poaching. Originally from northern Mozambique, he said he was recruited into becoming a shooter by a former South African National Parks (SANParks) ranger at a tavern.
He was lured by money: “I needed the cash. I could not find anything decent other than farm work. This was a better offer,” he said.
During a conversation at an informal market near a truck stop in Komatipoort, about 5km from the Mozambique border, he described in graphic detail how his syndicate accessed the Kruger National Park and got to kill rhinos and cut off their horns.
He mostly operated with two other accomplices, moving under the cover of darkness and entering the park either from Malalane in the south, or via Justicia villages or Manyeleti game reserve on the national park’s western border.
Komati Kortpad (short road) left: Investigators say this route, marked by official neglect and complicit silence, fuels the cross-border slaughter of rhinos. Photo supplied
Poachers’ shield
“Stealth is key,” he said. “The rhino has good hearing and a strong sense of smell. After tranquillizing it, we chase it until it falls. If the drugs are too slow to work, I can even shoot it; it usually dies anyway because of the cutting of the horn with an axe.”
After axing the horn off and making their escape into the dark, the terrain acts as the poachers’ shield, where they hide in caves or bushes until they reach their next stop, the drop-off site.
The rhino horn is left at an identified homestead where they take refuge before disappearing until the next job. The horn is then moved from this site to the next drop-off point, which can be a truck stop or retail business, by people who are never suspected, mostly women, he said.
Zitha claimed that different groups are complicit in the poaching network, ranging from regular staff at the Kruger to senior officials. “When a rhino dies, know that some insiders are aware. It is not just rangers; even drivers and some officials are involved,” he alleged.
The high-calibre hunting rifles he uses are often sourced from Asian hunters and corrupt rangers, especially his favourite .375 H&H Magnum, he said. He also claimed to be able to source AK47s, tranquillizers and other specialised equipment like GPS devices and night vision goggles “from inside the park via rangers.”
Zitha’s claims of insider collaboration are not unfounded. In 2024, Kruger National Park implemented polygraph testing as part of its Integrity Management Plan, leading to disciplinary action against two rangers.
In September 2024, two field rangers, Lucky Mkanzi and Joe Sihlangu, were sentenced to 20 years in jail each for their involvement in rhino poaching. Rodney Landela, once an award-winning regional ranger in the Kruger, is standing trial alongside former veterinarian technician Kenneth Motshotsho in a long-running case involving the poaching of a white rhino in the park in 2016.
The R571 to Komatipoort: A signpost to some, a battleground to others. This stretch, hawk-eyed by community patrols and farm security, has become a frontline in the fight against rhino trafficking. Photo supplied
Risks and consequences
Zitha mentioned the risks involved in poaching rhinos: “If an encounter happens with rangers even by chance, a shootout can ensue and people can die. Every time I go, I know it could be my last.”
Zitha admitted that he fears encountering rangers and private security more than the police. “If you come across the Afrikaner security or soldiers on patrol, it’s a different story. They don’t hesitate to shoot.”
Former ranger Sibusiso Zwane used to work at a private anti-poaching outfit. He described how he and his team made a high-level arrest of police officers who were part of a syndicate working with poachers. Caught red-handed, blood was initially discovered on their boots, including weapons and ammunition. Surveillance had been ongoing of this syndicate when the arrests were made.
There is fear of retaliation among rangers who expose what is happening, Zwane indicated. “Excessive talking can put one’s life at risk. You become isolated, paranoid and constantly fearful. I have seen colleagues who have been threatened and I have experienced such situations.”
The former ranger recommended that “high-stress jobs need good money. If not paid, access is given to intruders and poachers.”
Former ranger Sibusiso Zwane: ‘Excessive talking can put one’s life at risk. You become isolated, paranoid and constantly fearful. I have seen colleagues who have been threatened and I have experienced such situations.’ Photo supplied
Securing Kruger
In response to questions about the infiltration of poaching syndicates and internal corruption, SANParks said it has implemented multiple strategies to secure the Kruger National Park.
“We have rangers on patrol, technology to assist at gates and within the park, and our force multipliers, the K9 Unit,” said Isaac Phaahla, manager of communications and marketing at SANParks.
To combat corruption, he said, SANParks had instituted the Integrity Management Tool, which will assist in improving the standard of general screening of staff. “More rangers are being recruited, and resources have been allocated to support this screening initiative,” Phaahla said.
Recent statistics indicate that rhino poaching is becoming less frequent: annual statistics for 2024 show 420 rhinos were killed across South Africa, compared to 499 in 2023. However, Kruger National Park remains a hotspot, with 88 rhinos poached in 2024, a slight increase from the previous year.
The Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment is currently investigating two whistleblower cases involving corrupt officials, said its spokesperson, Peter Mbelengwa, in response to enquiries.
He said border protection is a shared responsibility between the Border Management Authority, the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police Service. “The department only becomes involved in cases when requested to do so by these responsible organisations,” he said.
Mbelengwa also highlighted the department’s collaboration with Mozambican counterparts and international bodies like Interpol and CITES to bolster anti-trafficking efforts.
Sibusiso Zwane at a private anti-poaching camp near the border. He described how he and his team made a high-level arrest of police officers who were part of a syndicate working with poachers. Photo supplied
Internal threats
Responding to questions on corruption and internal threats, South African National Defence Force (SANDF) spokesperson Rear Admiral Junior Grade Prince Tshabalala said: “One of the SANDF’s responsibilities, as derived from the constitution of the republic, is to defend and protect the republic, its territorial integrity, and its people in accordance with the constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.”
Repeated attempts during February to seek responses from key authorities via WhatsApp and email, including the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Hawks), were unsuccessful.
Questions posed to SAPS focused on anti-corruption measures among border law enforcement, efforts to combat wildlife trafficking, and protection for whistleblowers reporting corrupt officials. Similarly, the Hawks were asked about their handling of cases involving corrupt border agents, collaboration with other agencies to tackle wildlife crimes, and strategies to improve accountability.
Efforts in March to engage the Border Management Authority (BMA) via email and WhatsApp also yielded no response. Questions directed at the BMA included measures to ensure personnel and border integrity, the use of technological tools to enhance border security and detect illicit goods, and cross-border cooperation with Mozambican authorities. Despite these inquiries, none of the agencies provided answers by the time of publication.
* The names of these individual sources cannot be shared publicly, given the sensitive nature of the information they shared and the potential risks they face as whistleblowers.
The journalist chose to remain anonymous to protect herself and her sources. Reporting on dangerous criminal networks involved in smuggling, poaching and trafficking exposes her to significant risks.
This investigation was produced with support from the Southern Africa Accountability Journalism Project (SA | AJP), a partnership between the Henry Nxumalo Foundation, Oxpeckers Investigative Environmental Journalism and Viewfinder Centre for Accountability Journalism. It was funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of SA / AJP, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.